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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Christopher Weaver pleaded guilty to felony
possession of a controlled substance. The district court imposed a unified sentence of
seven years, with one year fixed. The district court also ordered Mr. Weaver to pay a
total amount of $689.63 in restitution, including $300.00 to the Twin Falls County
Prosecuting Attorney, as well as $280.50 in court costs.

About two weeks later, a

deputy clerk of the district court filed an Affidavit and Notice of Failure to Pay, stating
that Mr. Weaver had failed to pay the court costs and restitution, and, if the monies
remained unpaid, it would send the unpaid balance to a collection

with an

additional 33% of the monies owed to be charged as a collection fee. Mr. Weaver then
filed an objection to the order of restitution, which the district court denied.
Mr. Weaver appealed, asserting that the district court abused its discretion when
it denied his objection to the order of restitution, because substantial evidence did not
support the amount of restitution awarded to the Twin Falls County Prosecuting
Attorney, and the district court actually had discretion to extend the time frame to pay in
the restitution order.
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argued that Mr. Weaver did not show error in
the amount of restitution ordered for the costs of prosecution, and that the district court
properly denied, under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35), Mr. Weaver's
motion. (Resp. Br., pp.4-10.)
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's argument that, because the
district court denied Mr. Weaver's request to extend the time frame to pay in the
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restitution order after characterizing the request as a Rule

motion for leniency,

district court had to have understood that it had discretion to grant or deny

motion.

The State's argument does not show that the district court correctly perceived the issue
of whether to extend the time frame to pay restitution as one of discretion. While the
district court considered the objection to the time frame to pay restitution

in effect, a

timely Rule 35 request for leniency, its basis for denying the request was its belief that it
did not have jurisdiction to stop court clerks from turning unpaid balances over to a
collection agency. The district court actually had discretion to extend the time frame to
pay in the restitution order. Thus, the district court abused its discretion when it denied
Mr. Weaver's Idaho Criminal Rule 35 request/objection to timeliness, because it did not
correctly perceive the issue as one of discretion.
Mr. Weaver also challenges the State's contention that he did not show error in
the amount of restitution awarded to the Twin Falls County Prosecuting Attorney, but he
relies upon the arguments presented in his Appellant's Brief and will not repeat
them herein.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Weaver's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Did the district court
order of restitution?

its discretion when it denied Mr.
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objection to the

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Weaver's Objection To The
Order Of Restitution
A.

Introduction
Mr. Weaver asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his

objection to the order of restitution. Substantial evidence did not support the amount of
restitution awarded to the Twin Falls County Prosecuting Attorney. Further, the district
court actually had discretion to extend the time frame to pay in the restitution order.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Weaver's Objection
To The Order Of Restitution, Because Substantial Evidence Did Not Support The
Amount Of Restitution Awarded To The Twin Falls County Prosecuting Attorney
Mr. Weaver asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his

objection to the order of restitution, because substantial evidence did not support the
amount of restitution awarded to the Twin Falls County Prosecuting Attorney.
The State argues that Mr. Weaver did not show error in the amount of restitution
ordered for the costs of prosecution, because the restitution award is supported by the
evidence. (Resp. Br., pp.4-7.) Mr. Weaver challenges this contention, but relies upon
the arguments presented in his Appellant's Brief and will not repeat them herein.

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Weaver's Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 Request/Objection To Timeliness, Because It Actually Had
Discretion To Extend The Time Frame To Pay In The Restitution Order
Mr. Weaver asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his

Idaho Criminal Rule 35 request/objection to timeliness, because it did not correctly
perceive the issue as one of discretion. Contrary to its belief, the district court actually
had discretion to extend the time frame to pay in the restitution order.
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The

that Mr. Weaver's "argument fails because the district court

his motion for an extension of time to pay restitution as a Rule 35 motion for
leniency, and then denied it." (Resp. Br., p.8.) According to the State, "the district court
did not conclude that it lacked discretion to extend his restitution payment deadline."
(Resp. Br., p.8.) "Although the court did not expressly say it had discretion to decide
whether to grant [Mr.] Weaver's motion for additional time to pay restitution, by deeming
the motion a Rule 35 request for leniency, the court had to have understood it had
discretion to either grant or deny the motion." (Resp. Br., p.10.) Further, the State
maintains that "[t]he fact that the court even considered [Mr.] Weaver's Rule 35 motion
for leniency shows that its

of jurisdiction' comments were aimed at determining

whether it had the right to interfere with the court clerk's debt collection measures - not
whether it had discretion to grant [Mr.] Weaver's motion for additional time to pay
restitution." (Resp. Br., p.10.)
The State's argument does not show that the district court correctly perceived the
issue of whether to extend the time frame to pay restitution as one of discretion. While
the district court considered the objection to the time frame to pay restitution as, in
effect, a timely Rule 35 request for leniency, its basis for denying the request was its
belief that it did not have jurisdiction to stop court clerks from turning unpaid balances
over to a collection agency.
The State apparently distinguishes between "the district court's ruling on
[Mr.] Weaver's motion to extend the time for payment and its ruling that it lacked
jurisdiction to interfere with the court clerk's debt collection authority."
Br., p.10.)

(See Resp.

But the district court did not deny Mr. Weaver's request and then
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independently rule on its lack of jurisdiction. Rather, the district court's belief that did
not have jurisdiction was its rationale for denying Mr. Weaver's request under Rule 35.
As quoted by the State (Resp. Br., p.9), the district court determined that
Mr. Weaver's motion for additional time to pay restitution was essentially a Rule 35
motion, and decided that, 'To the extent it is considered in that capacity, and I will, for
purposes of this record, it's timely, is a request for leniency, in effect. ... I am going to
deny the motion ... because I have ruled [on] this issue already, and the reasoning is
this."

(Tr., p.13, L.25 - p.14, L.10.) To explain its reasoning, the district court first
how the ultimate responsibility for enforcing restitution orders under I.C. § 19was on the victims themselves, while this case

involved restitution under

§ 37-2732(k). (See Tr., p.14, Ls.10-21.)

The district court stated, "I don't think I have the ability to place limits on a victim
enforcing their own restitution order which can be turned into a judgment." (Tr., p.14,
Ls.22-24.) "What we're really talking about is whose business is it to collect monies
owing to the court system? And as I read the statutes for the clerks, it's their business.
It's not mine." (Tr., p.15, Ls.2-5.)
The district court then explained that it would not grant Mr. Weaver's request to
extend the time frame to pay in the restitution order, because it perceived that it
could not:
We can debate whether that's a good system or a bad system. I certainly
understand the consequences for the defendant. What's a person to do
when they're sitting in the pen, they have no assets, no ability to comply
with the clerk's directive? Now, all of a sudden, the bill's gone from a
thousand buck to another third on top of that, which is authorized by the
collection statute. Is it fair? No. Is it illegal? No. Can I do anything about
it? In my opinion, no, because I don't have the jurisdiction to do that. I
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think that is a statutory obligation of the clerk, and I'm not going to
interfere with their business ....

So on those grounds and for those reasons, the motion either as a
Rule 35 or as an objection to the timeliness I haven't ordered anything
as to when it's paid. That's what's really missing in this case, just says it's
owed, and I'm not going to alter my judgment in this case in terms of how
it gets collected. So the restitution order will stand.
(Tr., p.15, L.15- p.16, L.16 (emphases added).)
Thus, contrary to the State's contention, the basis for the district court's denial of
Mr. Weaver's request was its belief that it did not have jurisdiction to stop court clerks
from turning unpaid balances over to a collection agency. The district court decided that
it could not grant the

because it lacked jurisdiction to

collecting on unpaid balances, and thus did not have discretion

court clerks from
grant the request (as

opposed to recognizing that it had discretion to grant the request but choosing not to
exercise that discretion).

In the district court's opinion, it did not have jurisdiction to

"interfere" with the court clerk's "statutory obligation" to collect unpaid balances.
(Tr., p.16, Ls.6-8.) As stated by the district court, "Can I do anything about it? In my
opinion, no, because I don't have the jurisdiction to do that." (Tr., p.16, Ls.4-6.)
Because the district court thought it did not have such jurisdiction, it reasoned
that it could not do "anything" about court clerks collecting unpaid balances, including
granting a request to extend the time to pay. (See Tr., p.16, Ls.4-16.) Thus, the basis
for the district court's denial of Mr. Weaver's request was its belief that it did not have
jurisdiction to stop court clerks from turning unpaid balances over to a collection agency.
As explained in the Appellant's Brief (see App. Br., pp.8-12), the district court
actually had discretion under I.C. § 37-2732(k) to extend the time frame to pay in the
restitution order. Thus, the district court abused its discretion when it denied his request
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to extend the time to pay in the restitution order, because the district court did not
recognize its discretion to extend the time to pay. The State's argument does not
that the district court correctly perceived the issue of whether to extend the time frame
to pay restitution as one of discretion.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant's Brief,
Mr. Weaver respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's award of
restitution to the Twin Falls County Prosecuting Attorney, vacate the order of restitution
with respect to the time frame to pay, and remand his case to the

court with

instructions to consider whether to extend the time frame to pay in the restitution order.
DATED this 14th day of May, 2014.

/;;; ~2........, ···"-· ... :t"····· ..
BEN P. MCGREEVY
"'~
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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